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Increasingly, and particularly in response to the recent economic downturn, policy makers have pointed to
regulation as a “job killer” and have called for regulatory reform to promote job creation and economic
recovery. The empirical research, although limited, reveals a more complex relationship between regulation
and jobs, and fails to support the notion that regulation is either a major job killer or a significant job creator.
U.S. policy makers should not expect that the nation’s economic woes can be solved by reforming the
regulatory process.
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As millions of Americans continue to search 
for work, many political leaders have identi-
fied regulation as a substantial impediment 
to economic recovery. Each year, federal 
regulatory agencies issue approximately 
4,000 rules that collectively impose tens of 
billions of dollars in costs on industry.1 In 
addition, the recently adopted Affordable 
Care Act and Dodd-Frank Act call upon 
federal agencies to adopt hundreds of addi-
tional regulations which will impose new 
burdens on the economy.   
Although Republican politicians have 
been the most strident in characterizing 
regulations as “job-killers” and in urging the 
relaxation of certain regulatory controls on 
industry, even Democratic President Obama 
has spoken of the economic “chilling 
effect” of regulations and has taken steps to 
encourage regulators to consider effects on 
employment when making decisions.2 Yet 
despite how clearly regulation and employ-
ment have become linked in the minds 
of many political leaders, what we know 
empirically about the relationship between 
jobs and regulation provides much less 
reason to expect that the United States’ eco-
nomic woes can be solved by simply reform-
ing the regulatory process. To shed light on 
the contemporary debate over regulatory 
reform, this policy brief highlights findings 
from empirical research on the connection 
between regulation and jobs while consider-
ing possible avenues for future analysis of 
the employment effects of new regulations.
The Jobs-RegulaTions DebaTe
The connection that politicians have drawn 
between regulation and employment 
extends back at least several decades. When 
Ronald Reagan was running for President 
in 1980, for example, he criticized the 
Carter Administration for its “continuing 
devotion to job-killing regulation” of the 
struggling U.S. auto industry.3 Since 2009, 
use of the phrase “job-killing regulation” by 
politicians has skyrocketed and the linkage 
between jobs and regulation has forged itself 
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more deeply in political discourse. Figure 
1 shows how the word “regulation” has 
been increasingly accompanied by “jobs” or 
“employment” in national newspapers over 
the last ten years, following a trend that 
appears closely related to increasing rates of 
unemployment.
Responding to the recent economic 
downturn, policymakers in the White 
House and halls of Congress have urged 
policy action to address the effects of 
regulation on employment. In January 2011, 
President Obama issued an executive order 
expressly affirming that regulation needs 
to deliver benefits while at the same time 
“promoting economic growth…and job cre-
ation.” That order also calls on agencies to 
review their existing regulations and change 
or repeal those that have become “exces-
sively burdensome.”4 A year later, the Presi-
dent’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness 
issued a series of policy recommendations to 
accelerate employment, with regulatory pro-
cess and analysis reforms included among 
the Council’s major proposals.5 In May 
2012, President Obama issued yet another 
executive order that directed agencies to “be 
especially careful not to impose unjustified 
regulatory requirements.”6
In Congress, numerous bills have been 
introduced that would reform the regula-
tory process in the name of job creation.7 
The House approved one bill in December 
2011 that would have imposed on regula-
tory agencies a requirement to consider 
“estimated impacts on jobs (including an 
estimate of the net gain or loss in domestic 
jobs)” in advance of issuing new regula-
tions.8 In August 2012, the House adopted 
another bill that would have affirma-
tively barred agencies from adopting any 
costly new regulations until the national 
unemployment rate dropped to below six 
percent.9
Most of these recent regulatory reform 
proposals have been based on an assumption 
that regulation hampers job growth. Yet at 
the same time, it remains widely accepted 
that at least some regulations help foster 
conditions that promote economic growth. 
Even the recent Republican Presidential 
candidate, Mitt Romney, noted that “regula-
tion is essential [and] you can’t have a free 
market work if you don’t have regulation.”10 
Many defenders of stringent regulation go 
still further to claim that the imposition 
of additional regulatory controls would, 
far from killing jobs, actually promote job 
expansion. Environmental advocates point 
to “green jobs” created by stringent envi-
ronmental regulation, namely increased 
employment at firms in the alternative 
energy or pollution control sectors. Speak-
ing at the 2012 Democratic National 
Convention, former President Bill Clinton 
claimed that new federal fuel economy stan-
dards would generate over 500,000 “good 
new jobs” over the next two decades.11
WhaT The ReseaRCh shoWs
Is regulation a job creator or a job killer? 
Although this question has garnered 
heightened political salience, the empiri-
cal research evidence needed to answer 
it remains comparatively limited. Since 
1993, federal agencies have been required 
by executive order to predict how major 
new regulations would adversely impact 
the economy, including specifically making 
assessments of potential effects on employ-
ment.12 However, in few instances have 
agencies monetized the value of job impacts 
for inclusion in their prospective economic 
analyses of regulations. Agencies have made 
even fewer attempts, after adopting and 
implementing rules, to evaluate employment 
effects retrospectively. 
For decades, economists tended to 
ignore job impacts when analyzing regula-
tions, due to an assumption that any such 
effects would be transitory and relatively 
minor. After all, economically efficient 
regulation seeks to correct market failures 
and maximize net benefits—not maximize 
jobs. However, in recent years, research has 
documented demonstrable negative effects 
to individuals and families from unemploy-
ment. Especially when workers lose jobs in 
mass layoffs or in periods of high unemploy-
ment, they can expect to re-enter the labor 
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market having lost substantial earnings 
power.13 Job losses have also been found to 
be associated with an increase in psycholog-
ical stress, morbidity, and mortality.14 These 
consequential effects of unemployment help 
explain why jobs have figured centrally in 
the political debate over regulation, and why 
they should garner more attention from 
economists and other policy analysts.
Just as reflected in the political debate 
over regulations as job-creators versus job-
killers, economic theory predicts that regu-
lation could affect employment in different 
ways.15 First, regulation could increase the 
overall costs of all the inputs associated with 
a regulated activity, including labor, such 
that to continue producing at the same level, 
firms would need both more capital and 
more workers, thus encouraging employ-
ment. Second, regulation could increase 
the costs of regulated goods or services, 
leading to higher prices and correspondingly 
reduced sales—and thereby leading firms 
to need fewer workers. Finally, regulation 
might change the mix of labor and capital 
through the introduction of new technolo-
gies, and that change could either increase 
or decrease the amount of labor required for 
a given unit of output. 
With no compelling theoretical reason 
to expect regulation will result in overall 
job losses or gains, the issue becomes an 
empirical one. It is possible, after all, for 
any given regulation to have a positive or 
negative net impact on job levels within a 
particular regulated sector, and possible too 
for regulation overall to stimulate jobs just 
as it reduces them. 
What does the empirical evidence show? 
Only a few published studies have rigor-
ously examined whether regulation overall 
leads to systemic changes in employment, 
mainly in the context of environmental 
regulation (Table 1). In one of the earliest 
studies, economists Eli Berman and Linda 
Bui analyzed manufacturing job effects 
associated with local air pollution regula-
tions adopted in Southern California.16 
Comparing employment in that region over 
time as well as in comparable firms outside 
of Southern California, Berman and Bui 
found no substantive or statistically signifi-
cant effects of local air pollution regulations 
on employment.
Richard Morgenstern and his colleagues 
also evaluated whether reported spending 
by businesses to comply with all natural 
environmental regulations correlated with 
changes in employment levels across those 
firms, again finding no substantively or 
statistically significant changes in the four 
industrial sectors examined in the period 
1979-1991. However, when analyzed 
separately, two of these four sectors actu-
ally showed small, statistically significant 
increases in jobs in the face of increased 
regulatory compliance spending.17
By contrast, economist Michael 
Greenstone found a decrease of an average 
of about 40,000 jobs per year in facilities 
located in areas of the country declared to 
have “dirty” air and made subject to more 
stringent air pollution requirements under 
the Clean Air Act.18 However, because the 
differences in Greenstone’s study were rela-
tive ones—that is, derived from a compari-
son with areas in the country lacking the 
more stringent controls—it is not known 
how much of the decrease reflected true 
job “losses” rather than a shift in jobs from 
dirtier areas of the country to cleaner ones. 
Such a shift may even occur across facilities 
owned by the same firm but located in dif-
ferent parts of the country.
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A more recent, unpublished paper also 
reports changes in employment arising with 
regulatory differences associated with the 
Clean Air Act’s air quality designations. 
Reed Walker tracked workers over time and 
compared wage differences in cleaner (less 
regulated) versus dirtier (more regulated) 
areas of the country. He found that, in the 
five years following the imposition of new 
regulatory standards, overall employment 
in the more stringently regulated areas fell 
by at most about 0.7 percent and workers in 
polluting sectors saw on average a 23 per-
cent reduction in the present value of their 
wages following new regulatory controls.19
Considered today, the mixed findings 
across the existing studies appear difficult 
to reconcile, but at a minimum they suggest 
that the relationship between regulation 
and jobs is more complex than portrayed 
by either of the polar extremes expressed in 
political discourse. Undoubtedly, regulation 
does sometimes lead to some workers being 
laid off due to plant closures or slowdowns, 
but also it is certainly true that workers 
are sometimes hired to install and run new 
technologies or processes needed to comply 
with new regulations. More importantly, 
the research reveals that even if these losses 
and gains sometimes cancel themselves out 
when tallying aggregate impacts, regula-
tion still can create consequences associ-
ated with job shifts. Job shifts can occur as 
workers move to new facilities or assume 
new responsibilities within the same firms, 
as well as when they take on new jobs in 
altogether different firms. The transitional 
and permanent wage effects associated with 
job shifts, as well as losses and gains, cannot 
be ignored if researchers and regulators 
are to assess fully how regulation affects 
employment.
DiReCTions FoR FuTuRe analysis
Although more research is needed, it is clear 
that the empirical research to date fails to 
support any strong view that regulation is 
either a major job killer or a significant job 
creator. It may be that the heterogeneous 
nature of regulations (e.g., in what they 
require, who they burden), as well as the 
varied market conditions they affect, will 
make it difficult ever to generalize broadly 
about the job impacts of regulation per 
se. A better approach may be to improve 
the analysis of discrete regulations rather 
than regulation writ large. The effect of any 
individual new regulation on employment, 
after all, could vary substantially depending 
on the net costs the regulation imposes on 
firms, the degree to which compliance with 
the regulation will require new labor inputs, 
the competitiveness of the affected industry, 
the extent to which all or only some firms 
in the relevant market are regulated, and the 
price elasticity of consumer demand for the 
affected products or services.
The fact that some individual regulations 
may have meaningful localized effects—and 
that some regulations will have greater job-
related impacts than others—reinforces the 
importance of agencies developing better 
estimates of job impacts before adopting 
new regulations. Few would disagree that, 
all other things being equal, it would be 
better to adopt those regulations with fewer 
negative employment effects. Of course, in 
many cases, taking better account of job 
impacts may have no bearing on the ulti-
mate regulatory decision. For example, Reed 
Walker found that even adding his estimates 
of workers’ decreased wages to the costs of 
air pollution regulation did not substantially 
affect the positive net benefits attributable 
to these rules. Nevertheless, on some occa-
sions, adding wage or welfare effects from 
unemployment might affect agency decision 
making about whether or how to regulate.20
If agencies are to incorporate job impacts 
more fully into their future regulatory 
impact analyses, they will need to be able to 
make more reliable predictions of changes 
in employment likely to be affected by a 
proposed regulation, and then place a mon-
etary value on those changes to put them on 
the same plane as other predicted effects of 
the rule. To meet these analytic challenges, 
agencies will need to go beyond the existing 
empirical literature, gathering new data and 
conducting additional analyses. Not only 
are the results from existing studies mixed, 
but these studies are limited in the number 
of sectors and fields of regulation analyzed. 
Furthermore, the data used in most of these 
studies are now more than a decade old, 
before what has arguably become a new 
era of global economic competition—and 
certainly well before the major economic 
meltdown of the last few years. Both of 
these factors potentially could affect some of 
regulation’s impacts on jobs. 
Of course, recent changes in economic 
conditions—whether due to globalization 
or the economic crisis—suggest a further 
difficulty that agencies must overcome when 
trying to predict reliably the employment 
effects of proposed regulations in a dynamic 
economy.  Agencies sometimes adopt rules 
that take legal effect up to a year or more 
later, and perhaps up to several years after 
the agency would have started to develop its 
internal regulatory impact analysis, a period 
of time that probably stretches the limits of 
macroeconomic forecasting. To the extent 
that negative employment impacts from a 
regulation matter most in sustained periods 
of high unemployment, it will be difficult 
for regulators in advance to identify any of 
those periods when they are contemplating 
adoption of a rule intended to endure for 
years if not decades. 
The relationship between 
regulation and jobs is more 
complex than portrayed in 
political discourse.
ConClusion
The current period of high unemployment 
in the United States has focused the policy 
spotlight on the relationship between regu-
lation and jobs. A number of administrative 
and legislative reform proposals have been 
premised on the view that regulation hin-
ders job creation, although some advocates 
claim that stringent regulation can actually 
stimulate new jobs. This policy brief has 
reviewed the limited research to date on the 
connection between regulation and employ-
ment, finding that it does not support any 
strong claim that regulation in general 
has much of an impact on overall levels of 
employment, in one direction or the other. 
However, some regulations may still 
have localized effects on employment, some 
positive and some negative. These local-
ized effects will continue to concern elected 
politicians who naturally respond to the 
needs and concerns of their local constitu-
ents. As a result, to help inform regulatory 
decision making about potential localized 
employment effects, government agencies 
should expand and improve their analysis 
of the relationship between rules and jobs. 
Based on the existing empirical evidence, 
however, neither regulators nor politicians 
should expect that economic recovery for 
the nation as a whole can be secured simply 
by writing—or re-writing—rules.
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to the recent economic downturn, policy  
makers have pointed to regulation as a 
“job killer” and have called for regula-
tory reform to promote job creation and 
economic recovery.
•	 The	empirical	research,	although	limited,	
reveals a more complex relationship 
between regulation and jobs, and fails 
to support the notion that regulation is 
either a major job killer or a significant job 
creator.
•	 To	better	understand	the	effects	of	regula-
tion on jobs, government agencies need to 
gather new and more current data, looking 
at a wider variety of industry sectors.
•	 Based	on	the	existing	empirical	evidence,	
U.S. policy makers should not expect that 
the nation’s economic woes can be solved 
by reforming the regulatory process.
